chiruslawЮридическая наука в Китае и РоссииLegal Science in China and Russia2587-9723ФГБОУ ВО «Московский государственный юридический университет имени О.Е. Кутафина (МГЮА)»10.17803/2587-9723.2025.8.063-069chiruslaw-241Research ArticleГРАЖДАНСКОЕ И ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЬСКОЕ ПРАВОCIVIL AND BUSINESS LAWРазвитие фидуциарных обязанностей членов совета директоров в соответствии с новым Законом КНР о компанияхSubstantial Strengthening of Fiduciary Duties of Directors, Supervisors, and Senior Management and Collaborative Governance under the New Company LawЯнИнYangYing

Ян Ин, доктор юридических наук, доцент юридического факультета

Кайфэн

Yang Ying, Doctor of Law, Associate Professor at the Law School

Kaifeng

edith0027@sina.comГаоМин ЦюаньGaoMing Quan

Гао Мин Цюань, исследователь

Кайфэн

Gao Ming Quan, Researcher

Kaifeng 

405562479@qq.comХэнаньский университетHenan UniversityКитайско-российский центр сравнительного правоведения Хэнаньского университетаChinese-Russian Center for Comparative Law at Henan University202525052026086369Copyright © Ян И., Гао М.Ц., 20262026Ян И., Гао М.Ц.Yang Y., Gao M.Q.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://chiruslaw.msal.ru/jour/article/view/241

Фидуциарная обязанность, являясь ключевым компонентом фидуциарных обязательств, по сути, регулируют конфликты интересов между компаниями и их директорами, руководителями и высшим руководством, формируя незыблемую основу корпоративного управления. Несмотря на продолжающиеся усилия по обеспечению соблюдения нормативных требований, нарушения фидуциарных обязанностей директорами, супервайзерами и высшим руководством остаются постоянной проблемой управления. По своей сути, эта проблема связана не только с присущими ей недостатками, такими как размытое различие между фидуциарными обязательствами и обязательством по уходу, а также нечеткие определения сделок со связанными сторонами и самостоятельных сделок, но и с неэффективностью механизмов подотчетности из-за фрагментации правовой системы. В статье основное внимание уделяется изменениям в понимании обязанности проявлять лояльность в соответствии с новым Законом о компаниях.

Fiduciary duty, as the core component of fiduciary obligations, essentially regulates conflicts of interest between companies and their directors, supervisors, and senior management, forming an inviolable bottom line in corporate governance. Despite ongoing regulatory enforcement efforts, violations of the fiduciary duty by directors, supervisors, and senior management remain a persistent governance challenge. At its core, this issue stems not only from inherent flaws such as the blurred distinction between fiduciary and duty of care obligations, and unclear definitions of related-party transactions and self-dealing, but also from the failure of accountability mechanisms due to the fragmentation of the legal system. This article focuses on the changes in the connotation of the duty of loyalty under the new Company Law. By deconstructing the current situation, analyzing legislative loopholes, proposing a systematic improvement path, and ultimately constructing an organic unified system of the duty of loyalty based on the substantive norms of the Company Law and the implementation link of procedural coordination.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.