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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">chiruslaw</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Юридическая наука в Китае и России</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Legal Science in China and Russia</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2587-9723</issn><publisher><publisher-name>ФГБОУ ВО «Московский государственный юридический университет имени О.Е. Кутафина (МГЮА)»</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17803/2587-9723.2022.5.086-092</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">chiruslaw-181</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЮРИДИЧЕСКАЯ НАУКА БЕЗ ГРАНИЦ. Искусственный интеллект и право</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Правовой статус систем искусственного интеллекта</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The construction of artificial intelligence private legal personality system</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Ван</surname><given-names>Чуньмэй</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Wang</surname><given-names>Chunmei</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>профессор юридического факультета </p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p> Professor of law school</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">chunmeipzh@126.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Ван</surname><given-names>Цзинцзин</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Wang</surname><given-names>Jingjing</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>кандидат юридических наук, факультет экономики и права</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p> Ph.D Candidate </p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">chunmeipzh@126.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Тяньцзиньский педагогический университет</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Tianjin Normal University</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><aff-alternatives id="aff-2"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Чжуннаньский университет</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Zhongnan University of Economics and Law School of Law</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>30</day><month>10</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>5</issue><fpage>86</fpage><lpage>92</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Ван Ч., Ван Ц., 2023</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2023</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Ван Ч., Ван Ц.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Wang C., Wang J.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://chiruslaw.msal.ru/jour/article/view/181">https://chiruslaw.msal.ru/jour/article/view/181</self-uri><abstract><p>伴随人工智能技术的飞速发展和卓越表现，智能应用已然渗透进入人类生活的各个角度， 人工智能的法律地位无可回避。在理论层面，多数学者采用人类中心主义视角，认为人工智能主 体资格是一个可以计算的命题，并与自然人人格相比照，形成肯定路线、否定路线和中间路线三 种研究进路，对应“假设型”、“近人型”、“否定型”三种逻辑结构。其中，肯定路线将主体 性进行等同是对人工智能法律地位承认最彻底的一种方式，承认强人工智能是法律主体，是对人 工智能法律地位承认最彻底的一种方式；中间路线秉持“近人性”与差异型逻辑，亦承认人工智 能在本质上具有法律人格，将其归入主体范畴；否定路线秉持否定型逻辑，企图釜底抽薪式地解 决人工智能体的法律地位，将人工智能继续安放在法权结构中的客体位置，是最保守的研究进 路。在规范层面，域外国家对人工智能多持支持和开放的态度，欧洲议会法律事务委员会首先迈 出关键一步，首创“电子人”概念，描绘出未来强人工智能的法律地位图景。俄罗斯和韩国紧随 其后，前者在《格里申法案》中对人工智能体进行二元定性，后者在《机器人基本法案》中借鉴 欧盟“电子人”表达，确定了机器人伦理和责任的基本原则，明确了机器人的设计者、制造商和 用户的行为边界。比较人工智能体法律地位的三种不同技术路线，并借鉴域外人工智能法案，正 视时代与技术发展给传统物格体系带来的冲击，承认物格秩序的差序性，肯认人工智能体的主体 地位，将人工智能体置于伦理物格之中，为其从客体物向主体跃升铺就可能性。另一方面，借助 算法规则支撑，人工智能体得以创建规则和行动，进入权利要素的核心，尤其是其所具有的深度 学习能力，可以使其最终获得超越对物格的超越，完成由“工具”向“智能体”的进化。在制度构设上，基于人工智能体的技术存在和个体存在基础，同时考量其相对于自然人的工具性与手段 性，宜将其作为独立主体类型予以定位与确认，在规范上与自然人、法人等主体名称保持同构而 谓为“技术人”，并对其主体资格的取得和终止设置登记的要件与程序要求，同时淡化财产与人 格的关联度，不设必要财产的强制性要求，承认和赋予其有限主体资格，并在其主体资格非独立 领域，对其所有人或管理人设置以补充连带责任，以维护交易安全，达致受害人利益保护与所有 人、管理人利益保护之衡平。</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Artificial Intelligence (AI) Applications have already penetrated into people’s daily life, making the legal status of artificial intelligence an unavoidable topic nowadays. The legal personhood of AI, treated differently by scholars, is a controversial question. There are three different opinions about this, which are “Full Qualification”, “Limited Qualification” and “No Qualification”. Among them, the affirmative route equates personhood is the most thorough way to recognize the legal status of artificial intelligence. This route recognizes strong artificial intelligence as the legal personhood and is the most thorough way to recognize the legal status of artificial intelligence; The middle line upholds "Limited Qualification" and differential logic to classify it into the subject category, that is, to recognize that artificial intelligence has legal personality in essence; The negative route adheres to negative logic, and attempts to fundamentally address the legal status of artificial agents.This negative route regards artificial intelligence as an object position in the legal rights structure, and is the most conservative research approach. At the normative level, most countries outside the region hold a supportive and open attitude towards artificial intelligence. The Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament took the first key step and pioneered the concept of "electronic person", drawing a picture of the legal status of strong artificial intelligence in the future. Russia and South Korea followed closely.Russia adopted a binary characterization of artificial intelligence in the "Grischen Act", and South Korea borrowed the concept of "electronic person" from the EU in the "Basic Robot Act", and determined robot ethics and the basic principle of responsibility, at the same time, the Act clarifies the behavioral boundaries of designers, manufacturers and users of robots. On the one hand, by comparing the different theoretical routes and related legislation of the legal status of artificial intelligence, we need to face up to the impact of the times and technological development on the traditional physical system, recognize the differential order of objects, and affirmed that artificial intelligence has the status of legal subject. On the other hand, with the support of algorithmic rules, artificial intelligence can create rules and actions, and enter the core of rights elements, especially its deep learning ability, which can make it eventually surpass the "object status", and then complete the evolution from "tool" to "intelligent agents". In this sense, it is reasonable to take the form of “technical person” to identify subject qualification of AI: as for the acquisition and termination of subject qualification, it is essential to set conditions for registration and procedural requirements; as for property legal liability, weakening the relevancy between property and personality to give AI a kind of subject qualification similar to non-incorporated organizations’; in addition, in terms of non-independent subject qualification, the owner or the administrator should bear joint and several liability or bear supplementary joint and several liability for the AI’s conduct to safeguard commercial transactions.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>人工智能体；私法人格；技术人；有限人格；补充连带责任 作者简介：王春梅，法学博士，天津师范大学法学院教授，从事民商法研究；王菁菁，中南财经 政法大学博士研究生，从事法学基础理论研究。 基金项目：国家社会科学基金项目“人工智能的主体性及其私法规制研究”（18BFX113）的阶 段性成果。</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>artificial intelligence</kwd><kwd>subject qualification</kwd><kwd>technical personality</kwd><kwd>ethical personality</kwd><kwd>non-incorporated organizations</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
